reconsideration of mandated recusal

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DAVID DERRINGER

            Plaintiff,                                                            consolidated

                                                                                    No. CV-12-1307 and No. CV-12-10816

v.

DEBBIE HARMS, IRWIN HARMS, BARRIE CROWE AKA

BARRIE DERRINGER AKA BARRIE BEVERLEY, ALAIN JACKSON,

GERALDINE (JERRY) CROWE, AND WARREN

CROWE; ALL AS INDIVIDUALS,

            Defendants,

PLAINTIFF’S TIMELY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/RETRIAL UNDER NMRA RULE 1-059 AND 1-060(B)(1)(3)94)(6) VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS, OF THE ORDER DENYING  PLAINTIFF’S MOTION  FOR RECUSAL OF SEPTEMBER 20, 2013; REQUEST FOR ORDER DIRECTIVE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE BRIBERY OF JUDGE ALAN MALOTT BY DEFENDANTS NAI MAESTAS AND WARD AND BARRIE DERRINGER; AND REQUEST FOR THIS MOTION  TO BE HEARD BY AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE ALAN MALOTT

            COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, representing himself Pro-Se with his motion as stated above. The Plaintiff preserves all issues herein for further appeal as well as issues of abuse of power, and abuse of discretion. Deerman v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 NM 501, 864 P.2d 317 (Ct. App. 1993). “The judicial errors of law are noticed to the court before appeal.”; State v. Suskiewich, September 12, 2013 (NO. 34,187) “motions to reconsider should be encouraged in order to further judicial economy. ‘Motions to reconsider’ are a traditional and virtually unquestioned practice and serve judicial economy by permitting lower courts to correct possible errors and thus avoid time-consuming and potentially unnecessary appeals.” This Court, and future appeals and law enforcement should take  judicial notice of the Certificate of Service herein that this pleading is attached to a letter [Exhibit A] to various law enforcement agencies, Congressman Steve Pierce, Governor Martinez, as well as the news media and posted on the Internet as a public document under the 1st Amendment. Somehow, some agency must stop the judicial corruption of New Mexico, or at the least God help us all for the public democratic process might work to immediately vote Judge Malott permanently out of office at the next election. A judge that deceives the citizens to take Oath  to swear to God to enforce the law and then does what has transpired here in unconscionable. Judge Malott simply uses accusations  that the Plaintiff is "vexatious" as a vehicle to dismiss valid tort claims, deny due process, and "perform obligations" of the bribery for the Defendants. Barrie Derringer, thought at one time to be honest, have integrity and honor, is shown to be  totally lacking and found wanting of moral fiber to be totally embroiled in the bribery and public corruption of this matter.  In re Doe, 519 P.2d 133, 86 N.M. 37 “N.M. App. 1974 Failure to hear one party’s evidence, when offered, establishes a presumption of prejudice.” The hearing on this matter of “motion for recusal for cause”, was held on September  17, 2013, and the intertwined Motion for Change of Venue was simply ignored and disregarded, after Judge Malott’s already violating the NMSA 38-3-9 mandated peremptory excusal legally exercised by the Plaintiff upon “reassignment” on May 30, 2013, and Judge Malott’s violation of NMSA 38-3-3 to change the venue upon Plaintiff’s motion filed, with Judge Malott denying the Plaintiff legal presentation of his own testimony under oath, denial of presentation of case laws and authorities substantiation mandatory recusal for cause, and refused to allow the Plaintiff legal argument, explanation of exhibits,  or closing statements; in short the Plaintiff was denied “due process and equal protection” of law. US v. Guest, US Ga. 1966, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 383 US 745, 16 L.Ed.2d 239. All of these actions by Judge Malott were done due to the bribery of the Defendants NAI Maestas and Ward and Barrie Derringer as the court record shows that all decisions by Judge Malott in both CV-112-1307 and CV-12-10816 were against  Oath, Canon, and the Code of Judicial Conduct and against all “LAW”. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, .3d, 2013 WL 4478229, 2013 -NMSC- 040, N.M., August 22, 2013 (NO. 33,687)  92 Constitutional Law 92XX Separation of Powers 92XX(C) Judicial Powers and Functions 92XX(C)2 Encroachment on Legislature 92k 2499. Judge Malott has been bought by the Defendants under the meaning “bribery”  to rule against the laws as necessary to protect the Defendants until all claims against them are won or the cases against them “dismissed” by Judge Malott, which has been the tactic of unlawfulness taken by Judge Malott on September 20, 2013. Clark v. Clark, P.3d, 2013 WL 4499346, N.M.App., August 12, 2013 (NO. 31,547) ...abuse of discretion, “it must be shown that the court's ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason or that the judicial action taken is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Meiboom v. Watson, 2000–NMSC–004,  29, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P2D 1154. Judge Malott had a legal duty to render “justice under law” as prescribed by his Oath, and instead manipulated the law and the Rules of Civil Procedure to insulate and defeat any litigation against the Defendants by “bribery of the Judge by Defendants and their attorneys.  Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dept. P.3d, 2013 WL 4499132 N.M.App.,2013 August 19, 2013 “.. had a legal and moral duty, pursuant to statutory authority and his oath” The Defendants had not served the Plaintiff with proper notice of exhibits or witnesses, and in fact did not participate in the hearing September 17, 2013, other than the appearance of the Defendant’s representing attorneys, because their bribery agreement with Judge Malott already assured their “win” and dismissal of the Plaintiff’s legal tort claims by “public  corruption”. Unknown apparently to the attorneys Alain Jackson, Floyd Wilson, and Alicia Santos, just after the hearing of September 17, 2013 as they were standing outside of the courtroom, they were recorded as laughing at the Plaintiff David Derringer and stating that; "he's (meaning Plaintiff David Derringer) appealing that one too"; "Judges are sick of him"; "he is going from one Judge to the next but he is not going to win"; indicating, since Judge Malott would not make a decision of the hearing until September 20, 2013, that they knew their “bribery” was successful, and they had already won “dismissal” of all claims and that David Derringer would have to further appeal. Clearly, this “knowledge” was due to the ex-parte communication that the Defendants under bribery had with Judge Malott. This “win” was accomplished with both improper motive and improper ‘means’. Dooley v. Quiet Title Co., LLC  P.3d, 2013 WL 4526107 N.M.App.,2013 May 06, 2013; In Kelly v. St. Vincent Hospital, 102 N.M. 201, 207, 692 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Ct.App.1984), this Court noted that the tort could be accomplished by either of two methods: improper motive solely to harm the plaintiff or improper means. If proven, either basis standing alone will support liability. Id. In our most recent case of Zarr v. Washington Tru Solutions, LLC, 2009–NMCA–050, 146 N.M. 274, 208 P.3d 919, we set out the correct standard for a finding of improper means. What may qualify as ‘improper means' depends to some degree on context and can include, but is not limited to predatory behavior, violence, threats or intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, economic pressure, unfounded litigation, defamation, unlawful conduct, and perhaps violation of business ethics and customs. There is suggestion of “bribery of judges", employment of counsel to ‘influence’ the court going on here that the circumstantial evidence of everything done by Judge Malott was against all law and to ensure that no Defendant was prosecuted, even in violations of US Code Title 42 Section1981(a) against the Plaintiff to stop another suit against Defendant Barrie Derringer aka Barrie Crowe. The Defendant’s bribery of Judge Malott and Judge Malott’s acceptance and “performance” of the bribery is illustrated well in the court records of CV-12-1307 and CV-12-10816. Bribery is a criminal act on both Judge Malott and the Defendants contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-24-3(A)(3) (1997). All Judge Malott’s decisions in these cases and prevention of the additional case to be filed were  predicated on “public corruption” of bribery. Aguilera v. Board of Educ. 137 N.M. 642, 114 P.3d 322 N.M.App.,2005 April 06, 2005 “ where the decision was procured by corruption, fraud, deception or collusion”. There is a clear pattern here of Judge Malott ruling against the law, deliberately “consolidating” CV-12-1307 with CV-12-10816, refusing to be peremptory excused as mandated under NMSA 38-3-9, refusal to change the venue mandated under NMSA 38-3-3, and then illegally dismissing both cases under guises of “sanctions” for violations of  the Motion for Change of Venue, as requested by the Defendants; all the while “obstructing” the Plaintiff from acquiring the identity of the other 10 persons in the assault and battery and conversion under attempts by the Plaintiff under NMRA Rule 1-019, and “the discovery process”. Vigil v. State Auditor's Office, 138 N.M. 63, 116 P.3d 854, 2005 -NMCA- 096, N.M.App., June 01, 2005 (NO. 24,225) “every indication that [a] strong pattern of public corruption existed.”  In fact, the “consolidation” of both cases and the “imprisonment” of the Plaintiff before Judge Malott in defiance of all laws to recuse or change the venue, shows the willful bribery request and performance to keep all cases before Judge Malott and to rule to protect all Defendants from any prosecution by the Plaintiff to “rig” the cases for dismissal without due process. Citimortgage, Inc. v. Giron  P.3d, 2010 WL 3997939 N.M.App.,2010 February 18, 2010 “Defendant argued against consolidation of the cases as an attempt to “rig” the case outcome and as an abrogation of his substantive due process rights.” This unethical activity of Judge Malott is exemplified In re Griego 143 N.M. 698, 181 P.3d 690 N.M.,2008 April 11, 2008 Rule 27–401(A)(1) NMRA, and the courts  for “integrity”, “are charged with independently evaluating the record for the presence or absence of clear and convincing evidence.” In re Castellano, 119 N.M. 140, 149, 889 P.2d 175, 184 (1995) (per curiam). However, “we may give weight to the evidentiary findings of those who were able to judge credibility.” Id. at 149–50, 889 P.2d at 184–85 (citation omitted); see also In re Locatelli, 2007–NMSC–029, 11, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (per curiam) (citing In re Bristol, 2006–NMSC–041, 16–18, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905 (per curiam) for the proposition “that in administrative disciplinary proceedings this Court defers to the fact finder on factual matters but reviews legal conclusions and recommendations for discipline de novo”). we determine whether the law was correctly applied to the facts. See Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 12, 820 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1991) (citation omitted) (“When a party is challenging a legal conclusion, the standard for review is whether the law correctly was applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the court's decision, and disregarding all inferences or evidence to the contrary.”). Rule 21–400 addresses disqualification and recusal. Rule 21–400(A) requires recusal in cases in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Rules 21–400(A)(1) and (5) required Judge Malott to recuse himself in cases involving family members, friends, and family members of his staff, or in this case “friends” that have paid him off to violate the laws on their behalf. Judge Malott violated these rules when he did not recuse for “cause”. “Causes for recusal include the extreme hatred, aggression, animosity and prejudice shown against David Derringer in both orders and open court, and the admittance by Judge Malott  in open court on September 17, 2013 that these cases (CV-12-1307 and CV-12-10816) were very “personal” and that Judge Malott took “personal insult” of the Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse for Cause. Clearly, if Judge Malott did not want to be accused of “Constitutional and statutory violations” that mandated recusal for cause, he should not have taken the Defendant’s bribery to do so, and thus do criminal perjury to his own Oath. K.R. Swerdfeger Constr., 2006–NMCA–117, 14 “Substantial evidence is that evidence which is relevant and which a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Medina v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 1997–NMSC–027, 12, 123 N.M. 380, 940 P.2d 1175. The Plaintiff has been prejudiced by Judge Malott being an “advocate” and “defender” of the Defendants in bribery, rather than a fair and impartial “finder of facts”. Pargin Realty ERA v. Schmidt, P.3d, 2013 WL 4515964, N.M.App., February 08, 2013 (NO. 31,689) NMSA 44–7A23, unless a party appealing from the award shows that the award was obtained through corruption, fraud, or other undue means; a party was prejudiced by arbitrator corruption, misconduct, or partiality; the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers; and the rights of a party were substantially prejudiced. 44–7A–24(a).; Durham, 2009–NMSC–007, 34. “this Court is restricted to evaluating whether substantial evidence in the record supports the district court's [judgment.]” Judge Malott’s decisions are against laws and not supported in facts. Rule 21–300 addresses a judge's judicial responsibilities. When a judge is adjudicating cases, Rule 21–300(B)(7) requires that, except in specific situations, “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” In the context of office management, Rule 21–300(C)(2) requires a judge to require his staff “to observe the standards of confidentiality, fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias and prejudice in the performance of their official duties.” By either instructing or permitting his staff to process cases outside the courtroom and the presence of the state, Judge Malott failed to comply with this rule by allowing peremptory excusal of Judge Brickhouse outside of statutory and time restraints, and then obstruction of Plaintiff Derringer’s legal peremptory excusal by “reassignment” and defeat of a legal change of venue for “justice to be served” in order to keep the cases and complete the performance demanded by the Defendant’s bribery. Rule 21–200 requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 21–200(A) states that “[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” and Rule 21–200(B) provides that “[a] judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.”  Rule 21–100 requires that “[a] judge shall participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.” Judge Malott's conduct in this case threatens the integrity and independence of the judiciary by making a mockery of justice.

In re Key, 2005–NMSC–014, 5, 137 N.M. 517, 113 P.3d 340) (per curiam), disciplinary proceedings for judges have no analogous standards for imposing sanctions on judges. This Court has stated, however, that in imposing discipline on judges, this Court looks “at such factors as the nature of the misconduct and patterns of behavior.” In re Garza, 2007–NMSC–028, 26, 141 N.M. 831, 161 P.3d 876. We also note that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that when imposing discipline on judges, courts should consider “factors such as the seriousness of the transgression, the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the transgression, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others.” Judicial Standards complaints have already been filed against Judge Malott that prevented him from hearing the Motion to Recuse for Cause against himself defeating “jurisdiction” over the parties and the subject matter as erroneous in Order #1. Constitutional and statutory violations also defeat "jurisdiction". In  Order #2 the Plaintiff  complied with the Court’s July 10, 2013 Order and did appear and provide facts, circumstances, and documentation  in accordance with the rules of evidence, in support of the assertions of bias, prejudice, influence  and other impropriety of Judge Malott’s mandated recusal and the record is clear of open court of September 17, 2013 that David Derringer was denied presentation of his own testimony under oath, denied his case laws and statutory authorities, denied his explanation of exhibits, and denied both legal argument and closing statements, in deprivation of due process, known criminally by acts of Judge Malott as “conspiracy against rights”, “deprivation of rights under color of law”, and “obstruction of justice”. In Order #3, Judge Malott  prevented David Derringer as his own witness to present testimony under Oath, which with the presentation of documents that prove Judge Malott lying to the court record for corruption and tainting the record do constitute “evidence”, all of which was denied by Judge Malott. Instead, Judge Malott brings up other court litigation that either David Derringer is currently or past involvement, of which Judge Malott knows no facts, was not the fact finder of such litigation and simply attempt to use prior or current court litigation against the Plaintiff, when not able to look to other cases to decide this one. Matter of Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 309, US App. DC 97 “Judge in adversarial judicial proceeding...who reaches outside of record to decide case defiles process.” What is really happening here in Order #3 is Judge Malott defaming and slandering the Plaintiff, and attempted use  of criminal “intimidation” simply because the Plaintiff has had to use the court system prior and thus is not a “newbe” in recognition of judges acting against the laws in “public corruption”, wherein all of the cases quoted in Order #3 have no bearing on the instant case and cannot also be used illegally to stop due process and dump the Plaintiff simply because he was lawfully exercised his rights under US Code Title 42 Section 1981(a) “to sue and to be parties to suits”. What is really happening here is vicious acts by Judge Malott to punish and persecute the Plaintiff for past and present legal use of the United States Court System of our government in “cruel and unusual punishment” in violations of the 13th Amendment.  Jones ET UX v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ET AL, certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, No. 645. In Order #4, David Derringer, Plaintiff absolutely presented “cold, hard facts” of evidence that Judge Malott violated Constitutional rights of due process and equal protection, with “Exhibit 1” (Oath of Judge Malott) that also proved that Judge Malott lied in perjury in Oath where he “Swore to God” to uphold the law and then in proven Exhibits 2-12 violated the previously sustained “tort laws” of case law and did violations of New Mexico statutory laws against the Plaintiff under NMSA 38-3-9 refusing peremptory excusal and 38-3-3 refusing to change the venue “for justice to be served” and distorted the court record to cover up his violation of state statutes. Sexson v. Servaas, 830F. Supp. 175. The Plaintiff has standing to prosecute torts of “loss of consortium”, “alienation of affection” and other related torts denied by Judge Malott illegally, because the Legislated laws in effect at the time of the claim rests properly and can be understood as granting person in the Plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief. NM Gamefowl Ass’n, Inc. v. State ex rel. King, 2009-NMCA-088, 14, 146 N.M. 758, 215 P.3D 67. On September 17, 2013 the Plaintiff was forced to stand before the very same corrupt judge complained of, with Judge Malott stating of court record that he is “very  personally involved in these cases”. US v. Occhipinti, 851 F. Supp. 523 S.D.N.Y. 1993.  Factually, and properly, the Plaintiff made the court record very clear that the Plaintiff’s motions were not “personal” to Judge Malott, but that Judge Malott had violated rights and law and it was a “legal matter”. Judge Malott had even lied to the court record of the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike of April 22, 2103 of CV-12-10816 to Judge Brickhouse, illegally claiming that motion was being instead directed  to Judge Malott (court record clearly shows otherwise) so as Judge Malott could use that lie and corruption of court record in his order not to be able to be excused peremptory as mandated under law. This was done to keep the cases in the bribery from the Defendants. In Order #5, Judge Malott continues to lie and corrupt the court record that Plaintiff David Derringer is simply “dissatisfied” with the rulings, when David Derringer proves in each pleading and in open court that Judge Malott’s “rulings” do not comply “WITH LAW”. In point of fact, Judge Malott has no  “personal or professional integrity” when he defies Constitution and law he “swore to God” to enforce under Oath. The Plaintiff’s allegations are sustained in the court record itself and the “pattern” of violations of laws sequentially to effect the denial of prosecution of the Defendants  in a pre-conceived bribery by Defendants of Judge Malott that the circumstantial evidence supports entirely, which constitutes an “extrajudicial source” of bribery that mandates both recusal and prosecution for public corruption of Judge Malott contrary to what is asserted in Order #6. In this matter, it is not the “party’s  conduct” that is of dispute with the judge, but the Judge not following the law which is in dispute as well as the Constitutional deprivations of rights by Judge Malott. Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080. There is no effort to insult, bait, or alienate the judge in this matter, but a factual presentation of law that the Judge willfully disobeys, and then Constitutional deprivations of the judge meant to do a “conspiracy against rights”, “deprivation of rights under color of law” and “obstruction of justice” that no rational litigant would endure without complaint.  Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 95 N.M. 545 writ quashed 624 P.2d 535, 95 N.M. 593 “N.M. Court of Appeals 1980 Judge may be disqualified for statutory, constitutional, or ethical cause-Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 Subd. A, Constitution Article 6, Section 18.” Even though the Plaintiff was motioning the court for a change of venue and for a different impartial justice to preside other than Judge Malott, the judge presided to “control, intimidate and threaten” the Plaintiff, and did so in open court by yelling at the Plaintiff and slandering and demeaning the Plaintiff incessantly so as to disturb any pro-se litigation, which that alone mandated “recusal” with Judge Malott “embroiled” in the controversy. Purpura v. Purpura, 847 P.2d 314, 115 N.M.80 cert denied 847 P.2d 313, 115 N.M. 79 “N.M. Ct. of Appeals 1993.  In this matter, calling attention with good grounds of Judge Malott not abiding by laws and Constitution does not constitute “vexatious” or “frivolous” litigation and Judge Malott illegally dismissing the entire cases with “sanctions” due to the Plaintiff seeking “justice to be served” in a different venue and imperative to take the cases out of the control of a Judge Malott that would lie to the record and refuse to obey state statutes to recuse, be peremptory excused or change the venue was an insult to the Oath and integrity of the judiciary and there has been no impropriety here, but the Plaintiff has properly exposed the “public corruption” so that some form of government can stem and stop this illegal behavior of Judge Malott.  Skeen v. Boyles 146 N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531 N.M.App.,2009 June 29, 2009 “the “bad faith” exception does not apply here because they did not engage in any frivolous or vexatious conduct during the course of litigation”. Exposing “facts” of Judge Malott defying Oath and law is not “vexatious” but necessary for the continuance of the integrity of the judicial system of our government, no matter how distasteful it is for Judge Malott to be caught with a Pro-Se  litigant willing to stand up to the corruption of this judge. Beal v Reidy, 80 N.M. 444. 457 P.2d 376 (1969). David Derringer is not “vexatious” but has no legal recourse but to continue to expose these and other unlawful activities until some element of the Government takes corrective action. Prei, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 123 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1993).; Judge Malott is a proven “lawbreaker” despite Oath, by court record documents. A quote from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark in Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (June 19, 1961), as follows: “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."” (Emphasis added).; In re Aquinda, 241 F.3d 194. Judge Malott’s willful violation of David Derringer’s Constitutional rights should not go either un-noticed or un-prosecuted; Judge Malott not only is mandated to recuse and re-assign the cases to a fair justice, but must be removed from the bench under the guidelines of the 14th Amendment Section 3. Adamson v. C.I.R. CA9 1984, 745 F.2d 541 “Federal Courts cannot countenance deliberate violations of basic Constitutional rights; to do so would violate judicial oath to uphold Constitution of United States.” Order #7 is legally incorrect. Not only is the Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse for Cause, and the attending disregarded Motion for Change of Venue mandated to be granted by Judge Malott as both are very well taken, but under the “disciplinary responsibilities” of Canon, Judge Malott has to remove himself from the bench as a matter of law, and reinstate all claims of the originals of the Cases  CV-12-1307 and CV-12-10816 with a fair and impartial justice from a different venue. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (D)(1) Disciplinary responsibilities: “A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a violation of this Code should take appropriate action. A Judge having “knowledge” that another judge has committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question as to the other judge’s fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority. In  this matter the “judge” is Malott himself. State v. Hunt, 527 A.2d 223, 224 (Vt. 1987). Hunt involved an action to recuse two justices who had disciplinary charges filed against them concerning the case in question. The court noted that even though the decision to grant or deny a recusal motion was discretionary, a judge must recuse himself or herself where disciplinary charges had been filed concerning the case in question. In this case Judge Malott had already made up his mind not to recuse before the hearing of September 17, 20913 and not to change the venue, and the Defendants’ attorneys already knew of that decision before and just after the hearing, before any decision had been filed due to their bribery of Judge Malott. “A reasonable and impartial mind is one which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and only renders a decision after hearing all the evidence.” Pacheco, 85 N.M. at 780, 517 P.2d at 1306. At the start of the hearing, Judge Malott yelled that "he considered this a very personal matter".  “If a judge represents, before a hearing, that he or she has made definite findings, it is an indication that the judge is not neutral .” Keeping the Plaintiff from properly presenting his case in the hearing was not “neutral”. Orquiz, 2003–NMCA–089, ¶ 16, 134 N.M. 157, 74 P.3d 91; see Purpura v. Purpura, 115 N.M. 80, 83, 847 P.2d 314, 317 (Ct.App.1993) (“[A] fair and impartial tribunal requires that the trier of fact be disinterested and free from any form of bias or predisposition regarding the outcome of the case.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The contours of judicial indiscretions and bias is well defined in New Mexico and with the Plaintiff, when a NM Court of Appeals justice Cynthia Fry is allowed to preside over a case with David Derringer as Defendant/Appellant when at the same time she was a Defendant to David Derringer in Federal court over a suit of Civil Rights Deprivations. See: NM Court of Appeals No. 27,127 and Federal 10th Circuit Case No. CIV-03-0804 WPJ/RHS. Judge  Malott simply won’t abide by New Mexico or Constitutional laws. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 568 P.2d 790, 794, 1236, 1240 (1977). “A statute should be interpreted to mean what the Legislature intended it to mean, and to accomplish the ends sought to be accomplished by it. If the meaning is plain, we give effect to the statute's language and refrain from further interpretation unless “the intentions of the legislature suggest a different meaning from that suggested by the plain meaning of the statute.” (quoting also)  Sims v. Sims, 17, 21, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (1996-NMSC-078). Clearly, the last human being on this earth that should entertain this motion for any fairness or objectivity is Judge Alan Malott, who will instantly deny this motion in rage, retaliation, and revenge to persecute and punish the Plaintiff for exercising his due process rights and "telling the truth" under NMRA Rule 1-090. Judge Malott will deny this motion and further defy recusal, whether it is done sua sponte or by hearing due to his bribery and public corruption. Undeniably, this motion is mandated to be heard by an impartial judge in a different venue. It is mandated for the law enforcement to investigate this matter for the integrity of the judicial system as the NM Judicial Standards fails and refuses to act as already aware of this corruption and takes no action other than to protect all justices no matter what atrocities they perpetrate against the public and against Legislated law. REQUEST FOR RELIEF The Plaintiff request that Judge Malott recuse himself for cause under NMRA Rule 1-088.1 and change the venue  of these cases both being reinstated for prosecution under the parameters of the original complaints in CV-12-1307 and CV-12-10816 with full discovery available de novo as due process and equal protection of the US Congress intended from the judiciary. Respectfully submitted by: ____________________________________________ David Derringer Pro-Se Box 7431, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87194 CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE                   September 30, 2013 I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of this pleading to: Second Judicial District Court 400 Lomas NW Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 I hereby further certify that I delivered a copy of this pleading to: Defendant Jackson at: 423 6th St. NW. Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Attorney Floyd Wilson for Barrie Crowe Defendant at: Floyd Wilson 12480 Hwy. 14 North. Ste. 105 Cedar Crest, NM 87008 Attorney for Geraldine and Warren Crowe: Alicia Santos of O’Brien & Padilla P.C. 6000 Indian School Road NE Suite 200 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110 I further certify that I sent a copy of this pleading to the following agencies: INTERNAL AFFAIRS/white collar crime: FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 (202) 324-3000 Public Integrity Section Criminal Division Department of Justice                                       10th & Constitution Ave. N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Governor Susanna Martinez State Capitol Room 400 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 New Mexico Secretary of State 325 Don Gaspar Ave #300 Santa Fe, NM 87501 United States Attorney's Office 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 New Mexico Attorney General 408 Galisteo Street Villagra Building Santa Fe, NM 87501 US Congressman Steve Pierce 2432 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 KOAT-TV State News 3801 Carlisle Blvd. NE Albuquerque, N.M., 87107