Monday, June 17, 2013

CV-12-1307/CV-12-10816



STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DAVID DERRINGER
            Plaintiff,                                                           
                                                                                    No. CV-12-1307 consolidated CV-12-10816
v.

DEBBIE HARMS, IRWIN HARMS, BARRIE CROWE AKA
BARRIE DERRINGER AKA BARRIE BEVERLEY, ALAIN JACKSON,
GERALDINE (JERRY) CROWE, AND WARREN
CROWE; ALL AS INDIVIDUALS,

            Defendants,

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL FOR CAUSE OF JUDGE MALOTT WITH LEGAL REQUEST FOR THIS MOTION TO BE HEARD BY A DISINTERESTED JUDGE FROM A DIFFERENT DIVISION WITH ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT


COMES NOW the Plaintiff, with his motion as stated above, with a request for this motion to be heard in a different district with an impartial justice.
Judge Malott must be recused for cause involving (1.) deprivation of statutory rights, (2.) denial of Constitutional rights, (3.) failure and “refusal” to comply with former case laws involving the substantive matter of the complaints which translates to a (4.) violation of Oath, Canon and the Code of Judicial Conduct, (5.) working outside of jurisdiction with use of other cases and other judge’s opinions to make decisions in the instant case, (6.) a shown animosity and hatred towards the Plaintiff with abusive, derogatory and threatening remarks in both open court and in written Orders, (7.) degradation of the right to state facts and the truth as known by the Plaintiff, (8.) a bias and prejudice against the Plaintiff, and for the Defendants manifested in rulings against New Mexico laws to protect and insulate a multi-million dollar corporation and the CEO’s of same against the private pro-se party, (9.) and a shown distaste and subjugation of pro-se parties in general.
(1.)               The Legislated NM Statute NMSA 38-3-9 gives David Derringer a right to excuse one judge under peremptory excusal without stating cause with following the NMRA Rule 1-088.1(B)(C). This rule grants the right to excuse a judge reassigned to an existing case under sections (B)(b) mailing by the clerk of notice of assignment or reassignment of the case to a judge; and (C) Notice of Reassignment: Service of Excusal. After the filing of the complaint, if the case is reassigned to a different judge, the clerk shall give notice of the reassignment to all parties. Any party electing to excuse a judge shall serve notice of such election on all parties. Judge Malott denies David Derringer’s statutory right to excuse himself, by mis-stating the facts wherein Judge Malott illegally defeats NMSA 38-3-9 and NMRA Rule 1-088.1(B)(C) against David Derringer by falsly stating that the Plaintiff sought Motion to Strike relief of CV-12-10816 from Judge Malott and thus had no standing under Rule to peremptory excusal, and was outside of time frame. This information is false for the record clearly substantiates that David Derringer filed his Motion to Strike with “Judge Brickhouse” (filed “request for hearing” of court record April 22, 2013) and did not file any motions with Judge Malott over CV-12-10816. [1]  In point of fact, there was to be a hearing on April 24, 2013 before Judge Brickhouse, which had been vacated without any notice to the Plaintiff. Only then, when the Plaintiff showed up properly for the hearing before Judge Brickhouse did the Plaintiff learn that in clerk error, the case had been “reassigned” to Judge Malott. The Plaintiff on April 22, 2013 had already filed his Motion to Strike the illegal April 10, 2013 peremptory excusal of the Defendants “Crowe”. Only as of April 24, 2013 at the scheduled hearing did David Derringer receive a copy of the clerk signed Notice of Judge Reassignment which was never mailed to Plaintiff David Derringer by the court. As the illegal April 10, 2013 Defendant’s peremptory excusal was Ordered invalid and striken on May 30, 2013, wherein legally the case CV-12-10816 had legally been and was then proven to be before Judge Brickhouse, only as of May 30, 2013 was the case CV-12-10816 legally “reassigned to Judge Malott, making Plaintiff David Derringer’s peremptory excusal under NMRA Rule 1-088.1(B)(C) under NMSA 38-3-9 on May 30, 2013 entirely valid under “statutory rights” of David Derringer. Upon actual notice of April 24, 2013 when handed the Notice of Reassignment that proved to be invalid, and upon reassignment actually upon consolidation of May 30, 2013 David Derringer had a statutory right to excuse Judge Malott. Instead, Judge Malott rules illegally, manipulating the facts and dates to claim that David Derringer was both late and had requested a Motion under Judge Malott; both of which are untrue by the court record. Baker v. Horn, 201 Supp.2d 592 “Fact cannot become of record solely by virtue of its inclusion in trial court’s opinion.” Thus, the statutory law “right” was taken illegally from David Derringer by manipulation of the court cases by Judge Malott. Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 95 N.M. 545 writ quashed 624 P.2d 535, 95 N.M. 593 “N.M. Court of Appeals 1980 Judge may be disqualified for statutory, constitutional, or ethical cause-Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 Subd. A, Constitution Article 6, Section 18.” Taking away statutory rights is a reason for cause for recusal.
(2.)               David Derringer has a Constitutional right to “due process and equal protection” under US Code Title 42 Section 1981, and under the 4th , 5th,  and 14th Amendments. Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080 ATo be entitled to relief from allegedly unconstitutional actions of a judge acting pursuant to a state statute, plaintiff must allege...that a particular judge=s actions pursuant to that statute violated limits placed upon him by Constitution.@ Judge Malott has ruled in CV-12-1307 that “loss of consortium”, “alienation of affection” and “interference with a legal marriage contract” are not torts in the State of New Mexico, defeating David Derringer’s rights to prosecute those torts in both Cases of CV-12-1307 and CV-12-10816, when proven by laws to Judge Malott that his ruling was in manifest errors of law, and wherein Judge Malott refuses to correct the ruling to be in compliance with law; thus taking all ability to use the court system from the Plaintiff under the meaning of “due process” to have the redress and ability to prosecute valid claims, and to take “equal protection” from the Plaintiff wherein the torts are deemed valid and available for prosecution by the New Mexico Supreme Court where relief can be granted, and yet denied such by Judge Malott.  Romero v. Byers,872 P.2d 840, 117 NM 422 rehearing denied. “A claim for loss of spousal consortium exists under New Mexico law; overruling Rosebery v. Starkovitch, 73 NM 211, 387 P.2d 321; and Tondre v. Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond Inc., 03 NM 292, 706 P.2d 156.; Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 95 N.M. 545 writ quashed 624 P.2d 535, 95 N.M. 593 “N.M. Court of Appeals 1980 Judge may be disqualified for statutory, constitutional, or ethical cause-Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 Subd. A, Constitution Article 6, Section 18.” Taking away “due process and equal protection” is a violation of Oath, Canon and the Code of Judicial Conduct and valid cause for recusal.
(3.)               Judge Malott has a failure and “refusal” to comply with former case laws involving the substantive matter of the complaints being thus in perjury under Oath, and not abiding by the laws. Oath taken by Judge ____:  “I, Judge ___, do solemnly swear that  I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of New Mexico, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of the office of Judge on which I am about to enter, to the best of my ability, SO HELP ME GOD.”; In re Williamson, 43 BR 813 “An oath   is an affirmation of truth of a statement, which renders one willfully asserting an untruth punishable for perjury.”; Canon 3 (B)(2): A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. Canon: “Law” “denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law.” Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 95 N.M. 545 writ quashed 624 P.2d 535, 95 N.M. 593 “N.M. Court of Appeals 1980 “Judge may be disqualified for statutory, constitutional, or ethical cause-Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 Subd. A, Constitution Article 6, Section 18.” Violations of the “laws” of New Mexico including former case laws decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court are cause for recusal.
(4.)               Judge Malott has violated Oath, Canon and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Violations of such display misconduct in office. Under the legal sufficiency doctrine "[when a trial judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify, accompanied by an affidavit," the state statute or rule limits the judge to passing upon the timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge finds the motion timely, the affidavit sufficient, and that the recusal would be authorized if some or all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are true, another judge is assigned to hear the motion. Johnson v. District Court, 674 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. 1984).; Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1992); Wright v. District Court, 731 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1987); Hammons v. Birket, 759 P.2d 783, 784 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Colo. 1988). Birt v. State, 350 S.E.2d 241, 242 (Ga. 1986). Such violations are cause for recusal.
(5.)               Working outside of jurisdiction with use of other cases and other judge’s opinions to make decisions in the instant case is without authority or jurisdiction wherein the instant judge is not the assigned justice or the finder of facts and other cases are well outside of his jurisdiction and judicial authority. Matter of Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 309, US App. DC 97 “Judge in adversarial judicial proceeding...who reaches outside of record to decide case defiles process.” In short the Plaintiff is persecuted and penalized for prior use of the courts regardless of the issues of which this instant judge “was not” the finder of facts. State v. Reynolds, 111 NM 263, 267, 804 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Ct. App. 1990) “Matters outside the record present no issue for review”. Use of other cases to malign or defeat the Plaintiff and use of decisions contrary to law take all jurisdiction from the Judge. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 116 S. Ct. 286, 112 L. Ed.2d 9 (1991) “were performed in the complete lack of jurisdiction”. In this matter, Judge Malott has no jurisdiction over any issues of the Order of Protection of DV-12-234 (illegally held without any service of summons) or the “divorce” action between David and Barrie Derringer DM-12-610 or any decisions from these cases, which are not intertwined or legally bound to either CV-12-1307 or CV-12-10816. Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683 “If court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, that claim cannot provide a basis for imposing liability.” Judge Malott cannot consider actions of DV-12-234 or DM-12-610 for purposes of conversion, personal property, or loss of consortium, alienation of affection or interference with a marriage contract, or any of the actions or decisions by Judge Hadfield; all of which are on legal appeals. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services Inc. v. Feinstein, 103 F.3d 151, 322 US App DC 245 Rehearing denied 118 S. Ct. 65, 139 L.Ed.2d 27 “Courts decide cases within their jurisdiction rather than asserting jurisdiction because they believe that substantive claim ought to be considered.”. Working outside of jurisdiction, considering actions that have no direct bearing on the instant substantive litigation, or simply maligning the Plaintiff for having used the courts in other litigation, and persecuting the Plaintiff for prior use of the courts multiple times is cause for recusal.
(6.)               Judge Malott exhibits an animosity and hatred towards the Plaintiff, exemplified with derogatory, slanderous, accusatory and defaiming remarks in both open court and in the Orders from the court. As example, when the Plaintiff seeks to enforce his statutory rights under NMSA 38-3-9 Judge Malott declares that David Derringer is without good grounds, not in good faith, vociferous, and vexatious, when in fact David Derringer was legally correct and Judge Malott was violating state law and Rule to remain on the case. As the Plaintiff attempts to gain enforcement of discovery needed before trial and to identify the other Defendants properly under rule and law, Judge Malott ignores the proven fraud and perjury of the Defendants in their discovery answers, disregards Plaintiff David Derringer request and showing need against the Defendants for “sanctions”, all showing preferential treatment and favoritism. David Derringer is accused that he is of tautness, inappropriate, vexatious, and improper. Defaming the character of David Derringer when proper legal attempts are made to show the court the fraud, perjury and non-compliance with both rules and law by the Defendants hardly are due an unprofessional tirade of accusations and defamation by the justice. US v. Gordon, 61 F.3d CA.4 (Md.) 1995 28 USCA 455(a) “Despite external source requirement, recusal of judge may still be required if judge’s actions during trial considered objectively, display deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. “Partiality” that requires judicial disqualification is apparent disposition against party that is wrongful or inappropriate.” Admonishing a particular litigant that is operating under the Rules and law to protect the opposition or corrupt the record that there have been no indiscretions by the Defendants, when in fact shown and proven in record by the Plaintiff is both inappropriate and illegal. Sexson v. Servaas, 830F. Supp. 175 “Motion for recusal must identify cold, hard facts which create appearance of partiality.” As the Plaintiff asserts with cause of blatant preferential treatment of Defendants (violations of laws to stop Plaintiff’s litigation, and violation of laws enabling the Plaintiff to excuse the judge) precipitate threats. “Plaintiff’s assertion that Judge Malott has personal reasons that he wants to continue to preside over this matter”. “Plaintiff is warned that continued examples of his vitriol and hyperbole will be sternly addressed including imposition of sanctions”. Clearly, the Plaintiff is being singled out in such a manner to give later excuse of Judge Malott to “dismiss” the entire action under the false guise of “sanctions” so as to entirely protect and insulate the Defendants from any further prosecution. Purpura v. Purpura, 847 P.2d 314, 115 N.M.80 cert denied 847 P.2d 313, 115 N.M. 79 “N.M. Ct. of Appeals 1993 “If judge becomes so embroiled in controversy that he or she is unable to make fair and objective decision, judge must recuse himself or herself. SCRA 1986 1-011, SCRA 1986, Canons 21-300 Subd. A(3) 21-400”. Both the judge and the Plaintiff know what is happening here. The Plaintiff seeks to properly litigate and has never done any violations of the rules in pleadings, but has used “truthful” statements of a “cult control of Barrie Derringer, abuse, coercion, domination, forced submission, and exploitation”, such words and phrases not obscene or profanity, but apparently very distasteful to the judge and the Defendants, regardless of those allegations being the “truth” under NMRA Rule 1-090. The Plaintiff is then threatened not to continue. Thus, the Plaintiff David Derringer has the conundrum of succumbing to the threats and intimidation of Judge Malott and not further disclosing the truth in pleadings, not continuing to prosecute his case, not continuing to seek proper discovery, not to seek identity of the proper other 10 Defendants to come before the court being hidden by Defendants, and not exposing any perjury and fraud of the Defendants for proper “due process”, which in fact will not properly place facts and issues in the court record that will precipitate losing and not prosecuting the case properly, or, to continue to properly use the courts in due process, wherein Judge Malott will sanction the Plaintiff by dismissing the entire matter; either way exhibiting a penchant for the Defendants to win this matter with abuse of discretion and manipulation of the rules meant to perfect ruination of the Plaintiff’s cause of action. The US Congress never intended a justice to use “Rule 11” or his discretion and mis-use of power to deny due process, equal protection, prejudice the Plaintiff, and manipulate the means of litigation so as to gain an advantage from one party to another to “defeat justice”. Chavez v. Board of County Comm’rs, 2001-NMCA-065 130 NM 753, 31 P.3d 1027. “prejudice of a party; A party is not entitled to relief for a discovery violation unless the party has been prejudiced by the violation”. In this case, the court has precluded means of finding the other 10 parties by ignoring the Motion for Order for such, exempting the Defendants’ Harms despite their “availability or control” by having at their disposal an “employee” Barrie Derringer that knows this information, and no action to make Barrie Derringer herself, Defendant, to disclose the identity of the other 10 persons involved, thus keeping the Plaintiff from proper parties before the court and obstructing the justice demanded of the court for proper prosecution of the entire matter; accordingly allowing knowingly the perpetrators to escape prosecution. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 NM 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980) appeal dismissed 451 US 901, 101 S. Ct. 1966, 68L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) “Mere possession of information by different party is not determinative of the question of availability or control”. NMRA Rule 1-026: (B) scope of discovery (1) Parties may obtain discovery “including the custody and the identity of persons having knowledge of any discovery matter”. Disparaging and slanderous remarks, threats and intimidation are a violation of Canon, Oath and the Rules of Judicial Conduct and are conduct unbecoming a justice to give rise to reasons for recusal for cause.
(7.)               Judge Malott uses threats and intimidation for degradation of the right to state facts and the truth as known and believed by the Plaintiff as mandated under NMRA Rule 1-090, with claims that it is both distasteful to the court and the Defendants. The Plaintiff is being “set up” by the judge to stop litigation and needed disclosure in the court record, and if it continues from the Plaintiff, the idea to then sanction the Plaintiff by an entire dismissal of the cases so as to protect and obliviate the entire litigation under pretext that the pro-se Plaintiff did something so offensive to tell the truth that dismissal was in order.  Orders maligning, admonishing, and brandishing the Plaintiff for his attempts to “tell the truth” under NMRA Rule 1-090, and state facts in which obviously those facts are distasteful to the judge, and implicate the Defendants being protected, extends well beyond the availability under the laws that have already been presented by the Plaintiff numerous times. Judge Malott states: “Plaintiff is warned that continued examples of his vitriol and hyperbole will be sternly addressed including imposition of sanctions”. Frates v. Weinshienk, 882 F.2d 1502 cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 1297, 494 US 1004, 108 L.Ed.2d 474 “Recusal motion should be permitted at any time it becomes apparent that judge is biased or suffers from appearance of bias.” David Derringer is entitled to “opportunity to be heard”. US v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919 CA7 (Ind.) 1986 “Word should in Canon of Judicial Conduct which states that judge “should” accord to every interested person a full right to be heard, imposes mandatory standard of conduct upon judges and requires presence of both prosecuting attorneys and defendant at any proceeding which bears on outcome of pending case.” Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, Subd. A(4) and C(1)(a). To any person, the claims of “alienation of affection”, “loss of consortium” and “interference with a legal marriage” involve emotions, suppositions, facts supported by actions and reactions in reality, and matters of personality known mostly by the two spouses and their interaction, wherein this court denies the Plaintiffs “assertions” when behavior regarding such torts is hardly presentable in a tangible piece or stone or document to the court, but in “testimony” and intangible evidence from parties; information of intangible “facts” that this court refuses to allow the Plaintiff to put in his legal pleadings. In re Doe, 519 P.2d 133, 86 N.M. 37 “N.M. App. 1974 Failure to hear one party’s evidence, when offered, establishes a presumption of prejudice.”  Admonishing a Plaintiff for his presentation of issues is hardly a way for any equitable justice to handle tort claims that involve comfort, fellowship, affection, companionship, conjugal love, fellowship, and assistance; hardly something the Plaintiff can set on the table in front of the judge. US v. Occhipinti, 851 F. Supp. 523 S.D.N.Y. 1993 “Recusal is appropriate when judge has personal interest at stake, or some personal bias in favor for or against party to the action.” Clearly, the claims of “loss of consortium”, “alienation of affection” and “interference with a legal marriage contract” involve obviously containing “opinions”. The justice intends to stop the Plaintiff from exposing Defendants and stating facts that are “distasteful” to the Defendants such as a STD venereal disease involved in tort, even though such facts presented have extreme bearing on the emotional torts claimed in the Complaint. Deprivation of “due process”, “equal protection”, “opportunity to be heard” and a set up to mis-use NMRA Rule 1-011 to “dismiss” the entire action under guise of sanctions for the protection of the preferred multi-million dollar Defendants to defeat the litigation of the individual pro-se party is outrageous acts meant to defeat “justice”; acts that are a cause for recusal.
(8.)               The bias and prejudice against the Plaintiff is exhibited both in rude and admonishing behavior against the Plaintiff both in Orders and open court and the penchant of not ever discipline or admonishing either the Defendants or their attorneys when blatant violation of rules occur, such as simply denying and ignoring the Pro-Se Plaintiffs request for sanctions when the Defendant’s attorney was proven to have violated Rule 1-088.1, and the constant violations of discovery with Plaintiff’s requested sanctions; each request for sanctions being very valid, yet the Plaintiff admonished for such a request and no request properly granted. The bias and prejudice for the Defendants is more than obvious in rulings, wherein the law is not followed to allow the Defendants to escape the claims of the Plaintiff, even when the Plaintiff’s claims are fully supported by law in which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff, however is precluded from any trial on the matters as summarily dismissed in legal error. Instead of an American court being outraged that the institution of marriage has been destroyed and defiled by a “corporation” exploiting one spouse; the court here is outraged that an individual would sue a corporation and CEO’s that did extensive damages to his person, his marriage and his property. Bias and prejudice that is seen in this matter manifested in rulings against New Mexico laws to protect and insulate a multi-million dollar corporation and the CEO’s of same against the private pro-se party is a cause of recusal. 
(9.)               Plaintiff David Derringer is continually threatened with “sanctions” by Judge Malott, but when the opposition attorneys are proven to have committed sanctionable acts under  “Rule 11” of blatant violations of discovery including not even identification of themselves in the first round, necessitating the Plaintiff to have to file for an Order of compliance, and their fraudulent attempt to peremptory excuse Judge Brickhouse, and wherein Plaintiff David Derringer requests sanctions in both pleadings and open court that are both supported by law and necessary for “discipline” of attorneys, Judge Malott protects and insulates both the Defendants and their attorneys since it is merely a Pro-Se party seeking sanctions, wherein they would have been granted as proper litigant had an attorney been representing the Plaintiff. NMRA 21-400 disqualification: A Recusal: A judge is disqualified and shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. Threatening and intimidating a pro-se party seems to be a viable exercise to end the litigation and keep damaging information from the court record, if only Judge Malott could achieve David Derringer into forced submission, or the alternative is to create sanctions against the Plaintiff and simply dismiss the case; all in judicial mis-use of power and a manifest injustice as the judicial system was originally conceived by the US Congress and Constitution for “justice for all” and entire parameters set forth in the ideas of “due process and equal protection”. Daitchman v. Daitchman, 483 A.2d 270, 271 (Vt. 1984). Vt. R. Crim. P. 50(d) “requires Vermont judges faced with a motion to recuse to pass the motion to a disinterested judge.” and to. "It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35. State v. Linsky, 379 A.2d 813, 823-24 (N.H. 1977).
WHEREFORE for the above reasons, the Plaintiff request Judge Malott to recuse for cause and for this motion to be heard by a disinterested justice in another district.
Respectfully submitted by: ______________________________________
David Derringer Pro-Se, Box  7431, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87194

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE   June 17, 2013

I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of this pleading for filing to:
Second Judicial District Court
400 Lomas NW
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this pleading to Defendant Jackson at:
423 6th St. NW. Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102

And to the attorney Floyd Wilson for Defendant Barrie Crowe:
Floyd Wilson
12480 Hwy. 14 North. Ste. 105
Cedar Crest, NM 87008

And to the attorney for Geraldine and Warren Crowe:
Alicia Santos of O’Brien & Padilla P.C.
6000 Indian School Road NE Suite 200
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110


STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DAVID DERRINGER
            Plaintiff,                                                           
                                                                                    No. CV-12-1307 consolidated CV-12-10816
v.

DEBBIE HARMS, IRWIN HARMS, BARRIE CROWE AKA
BARRIE DERRINGER AKA BARRIE BEVERLEY, ALAIN JACKSON,
GERALDINE (JERRY) CROWE, AND WARREN
CROWE; ALL AS INDIVIDUALS,

            Defendants,

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID DERRINGER

STATE OF NEW MEXICO                )
) ss.
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO            )

David Derringer, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.                  I am the Plaintiff, Pro-Se in the matter of No. CV-12-1307 consolidated with CV-12-10816.
2.                  I believe that I cannot have justice in the venue in which No. CV-12-1307 consolidated with CV-12-10816 is currently located with the legal indiscretions that have been performed against the laws by Judge Hadfield and Judge Malott.
3.                  I believe fully that I have been the victim of discrimination and abuse of discretion under my rights to have ability to use the United States Court system for redress of torts committed against me in proper due process and equal protection of the law and all of my Constitutional rights have been defiled.
4.                  I believe that I have not received proper use of the court under Judge Malott for the following reasons:
(1.) deprivation of statutory rights
(2.) denial of Constitutional rights
(3.) failure and “refusal” to comply with former case laws involving the substantive matter of the complaints
(4.) violation of Oath, Canon and the Code of Judicial Conduct
(5.) working outside of jurisdiction with use of other cases and other judge’s opinions to make decisions in the instant case
(6.) a shown animosity and hatred towards the Plaintiff with abusive, derogatory and threatening remarks in both open court and in written Orders
(7.) degradation of the right to state facts and the truth as known by the Plaintiff
(8.) a bias and prejudice against the Plaintiff, and for the Defendants manifested in rulings against New Mexico laws to protect and insulate a multi-million dollar corporation and the CEO’s of same against the private pro-se party
(9.) a shown distaste and subjugation of pro-se parties in general with manipulation of the rules and abuse of discretion to use Rule 11 and threats thereof to stop and control the instant litigation or arrange for the discretion to dismiss the case with claims of sanctions under Rule 11 to defeat the cause of the Plaintiff, and allow the Defendants to escape prosecution; not at all what the US Congress envisioned a justice to do while legislating the US Court system
Further, Affiant sayeth naught.
____________________________________
                       David Derringer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of June, 2013 by David Derringer.

____________________________________
(Seal)                                                               Notary Public


My commission expires:_________________________
 





[1] (C) Notice of Reassignment: Service of Excusal. After the filing of the complaint, if the case is reassigned to a different judge, the clerk shall give notice of the reassignment to all parties. Only as of April 24, 2013 in the courtroom of Judge Brickhouse did David Derringer receive any notice of any reassignment, handed to him, which proved to be invalid on May 30, 2013 making the case at all times before Judge Brickhouse.

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